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Comment Jason McDonald
The issue of how governments should manage their contingent liabilities is
receiving increasing attention internationally (see Polackova-Brixi and
Schick 2002). Dr. Llanto’s chapter contributes to this burgeoning literature
with a valuable examination of government-contingent liabilities in the
Philippines. The chapter analyzes the ﬁscal risks associated with contin-
gent liabilities, many of which are associated with private ﬁnancing ar-
rangements of public infrastructure, and proposes some possible manage-
ment solutions.
This increasing attention appears to be driven by two ﬁscal problems as-
sociated with governments using contingent liabilities. The ﬁrst is the pos-
sibility of increasing the adverse implications of macroeconomic risks.
Where such risks are not transparent, investors face increased uncertainty
as to the true extent of a government’s ﬁscal liabilities. Further, the ﬁscal
risks inherent in contingent liabilities may be systematically related—for
example, guarantees over exchange rate values in diﬀerent contracts can
easily crystallize at the same time. Finally, contingent liabilities have no
overt budgetary constraint (unlike traditional spending) that can hinder
macroeconomic control.
The second ﬁscal problem is the potential microeconomic distortions
from government’s using contingent liabilities where no market failures ex-
ist. In such cases, contingent liabilities contain an implicit subsidy (equal
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tralian Government.to the market value of the contingent liability less the present value of any
expected cash ﬂows to government). This subsidy occurs regardless of
whether the contingent liability is called upon and becomes an outlay. The
subsidy is also substitutable with other forms of government assistance—
such as tax concessions or direct outlays. Governments could, for example,
pay other ﬁnancial institutions to take on many ﬁscal risks contained in
contingent liabilities rather than retaining the risk themselves. All risk has
its price.
However, contingent liabilities tend to be more costly policy instruments
for meeting government objectives compared to traditional spending, par-
ticularly because they are less transparent. Neither of the international ﬁ-
nancial reporting standards—the International Monetary Fund’s Gov-
ernment Finance Statistics or the Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles—provide users of government ﬁnancial reports with much as-
sistance in properly valuing contingent liabilities. Since they are less trans-
parent, governments have an incentive to provide them over traditional ex-
penditures. Contingent liabilities are also very often diﬃcult to measure,
making them hard to rank for budgetary purposes. Sometimes they require
highly specialized and costly skills to evaluate—resources likely to be
scarce in the public sector of even highly developed economies. Contingent
liabilities should be seen as a form of ﬁnancing for government activities,
like traditional debt. However, they are signiﬁcantly less liquid and subject
to information problems compared to debt. Contingent liabilities are
worth more to a more risky recipient, leading to a severe adverse selection
problem. They also have clear moral hazard problems since recipients are
absolved from the responsibility of managing the risks covered by the con-
tingent liability.
What is to be done about contingent liabilities? The chapter outlines
some best-practice management practices that can be usefully adopted. In-
tegration of debt and contingent liability management—eﬀectively in-
creasing central agency control of expenditure—has been persuasively
suggested in other papers (for example, Currie and Velandia-Rubiano
2002). Debt managers are more likely to have the ﬁnancial skills for as-
sessing and pricing contingent liabilities (see, for example, Hagelin and
Thor 2003). Improved budgetary reforms—such as provisioning and
charging agencies for supplying contingent liabilities—can also change the
incentives facing government agencies. Such steps can improve the infor-
mation provided to government for decision making.
However, it is questionable whether many governments face suﬃcient in-
centive to reduce the use of contingent liabilities, even if they were provided
with the correct ﬁnancial information. Therefore a key to improved man-
agement of contingent liabilities by governments must include increased
disclosure. While the chapter tends to focus on improving competition and
regulation in order to reduce demand by businesses for contingent liabili-
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ernment.
Finally, the chapter raises an interesting question about the eﬃcient ex-
tent of contingent liabilities provided by government. For eﬃciency, risks
need to be distributed to those best able to manage them. Governments
may be better at managing risks when they have better information. As
noted in the chapter, this implies that governments should at least bear sov-
ereign risks, such as those associated with governments changing policy to
reap rents from large infrastructure projects. However, there is an interest-
ing question about how much sovereign risk the government should be ex-
pected to bear if private investors choose to invest in countries with gener-
allyrisky regulatory environments. In such cases, general regulation failure
acts like a general tariﬀ—and it is by no means certain that selective tariﬀ
exemptions (or regulatory guarantees) for speciﬁc projects will improve
economic eﬃciency.
Overall the chapter provides an excellent benchmark for similar studies
of other countries—although, while reading the chapter I wondered why
so much of the information it contained was not routinely issued by all gov-
ernments.
References
Currie, E., and A. Velandia-Rubiano. 2002. Risk management of contingent liabili-
ties within a sovereign asset-liability framework. retrieved from http://treasury.world
bank.org/Services/Public Debt Management/Resources/References.html
Hagelin, N., and M. Thor. 2003. Pricing of state guarantees in practice. In Central
government borrowing: Forecast and analysis, 18–22. Stockholm: Swedish Na-
tional Debt Oﬃce.
Polackova-Brixi, H., and A. Schick, eds. 2002. Government at risk. Washington,
DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World
Bank.
Comment Shigeki Kunieda
Contingent liability is recognized as one of the important causes of ﬁscal
instability in developing countries. Various measures to manage contin-
gent liability and ﬁscal risk are actively discussed by international ﬁnancial
institutions and academic researchers (Brixi and Schick 2002).
The Llanto chapter provides a valuable survey on the Philippine
contingent-liability problem (especially its depth and seriousness). The pol-
icy proposals discussed in the chapter are comprehensive and consistent
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